A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea by D\u27Ambra, Laureen
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 4
Spring 1997
A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver
of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea
Laureen D'Ambra
State of Rhode Island
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University
Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
D'Ambra, Laureen (1997) "A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea," Roger Williams
University Law Review: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol2/iss2/4
A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime:
Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is
Not a Panacea
Laureen D'Ambra*
I RODUCTION
Policy makers throughout the country are responding to the
increasing sentiment that violent juvenile offenders should face
the same penalties as their adult counterparts.' This public outcry
is a direct response to the misguided perception that juvenile
crime, particularly violent in nature, is escalating.2 However,
based on the most recent statistics of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI), violent juvenile crime decreased in 1995.3 This un-
expected news surprises both a public increasingly fearful of a rise
in violent juvenile crime and legislators who tout the familiar man-
tra, "adult time for adult crime."
Repeat violent offenders comprise only a small fraction of juve-
nile delinquents. Some national studies suggest that as low as five
percent of violent acts are committed by young people.4 Other
studies place the statistics at thirteen percent. Despite diametric
* B.S. 1977, Suffolk University, JD. 1980, Suffolk University. Laureen
D'Ambra has been the Child Advocate for the State of Rhode Island since her ap-
pointment by the Governor in 1989.
1. Stacey Sabo, Note, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2425, 2435-36 (1996) (noting that 47 states
and the District of Columbia have enacted judicial waiver statutes); Barry C. Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79
Minn. L. Rev. 965, 982-83 (1995).
2. Linda F. Giardino, Note, Youth, Family and the Law: Defining Rights and
Establishing Recognition--Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Jus-
tice Policies in America, 5 J.L. & Polly 223, 229-30 (1996).
3. Robert L. Jackson, FBI: Violent Crimes by Youths Decline, Prov. J. Bull.,
Aug. 9, 1996, at Al.
4. Ted Gest & Victoria Pope, Crime Time Bomb, U.S. News & World Rep.,
Mar. 25, 1996, at 36, available in 1996 WL 7810430.
277
278 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:277
statistics, the fact remains that the majority of repeat juvenile of-
fenders who are transferred to adult courts have not committed
violent crimes against persons; rather, "the majority of juveniles
transferred to adult courts are typically chronic, petty property of-
fenders sent there by judges often fed up with seeing them re-
turning time and time again."5 Since most juveniles arrested once
do not commit subsequent crimes, many of the recently enacted
automatic waiver statutes unnecessarily target youths who have
an opportunity to reform.6 This assertion is strongly supported by
the fact that reformation and rehabilitation were at the heart of
the development of juvenile courts. 7
Today, the juvenile system is under attack.8 Policy makers in-
creasingly neglect the original goals of rehabilitation and preven-
tion in favor of retributive and punitive measures.9 With the
general public distraught with crime and a juvenile punishment
system that it believes is too brief and too lenient on crime, the
public sentiment that youth offenders should suffer adult conse-
quences persists.10 As a result, legislators gravitate toward
tougher measures. Many states are passing new laws that provide
for the waiver of increasing numbers of juveniles into adult
court.'- Moreover, the landscape is changing so rapidly, experts
have not yet assessed the impact of these laws on juvenile crime. 12
While proponents of measures which treat youths as adults ac-
knowledge that the nation's overall crime rate is declining, they
5. Sarah Glazer, Juvenile Justice: Should Violent Youths Get Tougher Pun-
ishments?, CQ Researcher, Feb. 25, 1994, at 1.
6. Id.
7. See generally Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile
Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Court, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1254
(1996); Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 Wis. L. Rev.
375, 376-77.
8. E.g., Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to
Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 507 (1995); see Janet
E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); Melli, supra
note 7, at 376.
9. Melli, supra note 7, at 389-90; Sabo, supra note 1, at 2434-36. See gener-
ally Giardino, supra note 2.
10. '[Seventy-three] percent of the respondents to a recent USA TodayIONN/
Gallup survey said juveniles who commit violent crimes should be punished the
same as adults." Glazer, supra note 5, at 171.
11. Id- at 176.
12. Fox Butterfield, States Revamping Laws on Juveniles as Felonies Soar,
N.Y. Times, May 12, 1996, at 24, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
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suggest that the crime rate for teens is likely to rise.' 3 They also
argue that the juvenile justice system is not equipped to handle
youths committing violent or "adult" crimes. 14 But punitive means
of dealing with juvenile offenders undermine the rehabilitative
philosophy upon which the juvenile justice system was founded a
century ago, and represent an abandonment of hope for our chil-
dren. Abandoning the rehabilitative model for a punitive model is
a weak attempt to abate the complex problem. Youths are labeled
adults and turned over to the adult system "not because the
juveniles have reached a level of maturity consonant with adult-
hood but rather because society has given up on them."' 5
In reality, children are much more likely to be victims of crime
than offenders.' 6 Those who do become perpetrators often experi-
ence mitigating circumstances of neglect, abuse, violence and pov-
erty. The solution is not tougher punishment, which could turn
those who could be rehabilitated into career criminals; rather, the
solution is a greater attempt at prevention, education and reform,
as well as targeting guns and drugs to decrease crime.' 7
Waiver policies, when used, should further the original goals
of the juvenile system by transferring only the limited number of
egregious offenders who cannot be reformed, and thereby would
endanger public safety. This type of determination requires indi-
vidual assessment, not automatic transfer policies, because, unlike
individual assessment, automatic transfer considers neither the
causes of juvenile crime nor the consequences of adult treatment.'8
I. TEE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
In 1882, national legislation gave "criminal courts discretion
either to sentence juveniles to reform school or to impose 'such
13. Richard Serrano & David Savage, Fighting Juvenile Crime Takes on New
Urgency, Prov. J. Bull., July 21, 1996, at D1.
14. See Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun, Should 13-Year-Olds Who Commit Crimes
with Firearms be Tried as Adults? Yes: Send a Message to Young Criminals, 80
A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (1994).
15. Guttman, supra note 8, at 509.
16. See generally Rhode Island KIDS COUNT, 1996 Rhode Island Kids Count
Factbook 46-55 (1996) (hereinafter Kids Count Factbook].
17. Glazer, supra note 5, at 171.
18. Guttman, supra note 8, at 520.
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punishment as is otherwise provided by the law.."" 9 Legislators
instituted nationwide reforms in the late nineteenth century to
achieve more humane treatment of juveniles, including the estab-
lishment of houses of refuge to separate youth from adult prisoners
and the eventual establishment of a separate juvenile court sys-
tem. Since children were considered amenable to rehabilitation,
the first juvenile courts were considered civil rather than criminal,
with judges who dispensed treatment rather than punishment.20
The original juvenile court was established in Chicago, in
1899, to deal with young troublemakers whose misdeeds included
acts such as throwing rocks through windows. Since its inception,
the juvenile justice system has been geared toward child welfare,
individual assessment and treatment. The goal was to reintegrate
youths into society.2 1 Accordingly, the establishment of this sys-
tem was grounded in the beliefs that juveniles were inherently less
guilty than adult offenders, that juvenile offenders could be reha-
bilitated and therefore should be 'treated" ather than punished,
and that youngsters should not be stigmatized and hardened by
contact with adult criminals. 22
The nation's early treatment of juvenile offenders was gov-
erned by the common law presumption that a child less than seven
years old was incapable of forming criminal intent.23 A rebuttable
presumption of incapacity existed for children ages seven to four-
teen.24 Philosophical changes in this benevolent system began in
the mid-1960s, when the United States Supreme Court extended
due process rights to juveniles.2
As crime rates rose through the 1970s, a national trend to-
ward making juvenile court proceedings more like adult criminal
courts began,26 marking the beginning of public pressure for more
19. John J. Cloherty Ila, Note, The Serious Juvenile Offender in the Adult
Criminal System: The Jurisprudence of Rhode Island's Waiver and Certification
Procedures, 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 407, 414 (1992) (quoting 1882 I. Pub. Laws ch.
248, § 49).
20. Cintron, supra note 7, at 1258-59; Guttman, supra note 8, at 511-15.
21. Guttman, supra note 8, at 510-12.
22. See generally Sabo, supra note 1.
23. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 1.
24. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 413 n.40.
25. Guttman, supra note 8, at 513 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966)).
26. Id. at 514-15. A comparison of the FBrs 1992 data with data from the
1970s demonstrated that overall, more youth crime and violence occurred in the
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retributive measures against youth offenders. Proponents of these
measures argued that the juvenile system was incapable of han-
dling serious offenders and that "treatment" was ineffective.
Rather than trying to improve rehabilitative methods, they sought
to abolish the existing juvenile system altogether.27
In Kent v. United States,28 the Court held that a District of
Columbia statute entitled, "Juveniles to a hearing, access to coun-
sel, and statement of the court's reasons for waiving jurisdiction,"
required full investigation for juvenile waiver. 29 The Court deline-
ated the following determinative factors in a waiver decision:
the seriousness of the offense; the offense's violent or wilful
nature; whether the offense harmed persons or property; the
complaint's prosecutive merit; the desirability of disposing of
the offense in one court if adults were also charged; the juve-
nile's sophistication and maturity; the juvenile's record and
previous history; and the prospects for adequate protection of
the public or rehabilitation of the juvenile in the juvenile
court.3
0
Following Kent with In re Gault3 ' and In re Winship,32 the
Court afforded juveniles additional rights, including notice of
charges, privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, and the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceedings.3 3 As a result of these
decisions, juvenile offenders in the past three decades have been
afforded the same constitutional rights as adults.
II. EVOLUTION OF A PuNTnrE PHIosoPHY: JuvENm COURT V.
ADULT COURT
Proponents of tougher, more punitive measures against juve-
nile offenders argue that the juvenile court philosophy advocating
the best interests of the child is from a "bygone era."3 4 Yesterday's
1970s, a decade marked by the baby boom generation and a greater influx of young
people. Juvenile Crime Report Tells Complex Story of Violence, Prov. J. Bull., Oct.
14, 1993, at A15.
27. Guttman, supra note 8, at 515.
28. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. Id at 554; see also Cloherty, supra note 19, at 418-19.
30. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 419 n.70 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67).
31. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
33. Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-27; Winship, 397 U.S. at 359, 361-67.
34. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 1.
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delinquents had fistfights, shoplifted and stole bikes and cars; to-
day, they are armed with deadly weapons and devoid of respect for
others as they commit robberies, burglaries, rapes and murders. 35
With demographics projecting a thirty percent rise in fifteen to
nineteen year olds in the next decade, the Federal Office for Juve-
nile Justice predicts a corresponding doubling of juvenile arrests
for violent crime.36 Fearing a perceived increase in random juve-
nile crime, many Americans feel that juvenile waiver is necessary
to protect society.
Analysis of recent trends in juvenile crime and youth violence
demonstrates otherwise. Consequently, propagating more punitive
measures may not be as urgent or productive as proponents sug-
gest. FBI statistics released by the Justice Department in August
1996 demonstrated that youth arrests for violent crimes decreased
in 1995 for the first time in seven years, despite a rise in violent
crime arrests among adults and a rise in the youth population.3 7
The decline in the arrest rate for murder by juveniles was even
more pronounced-a 15.2% decrease from 1994. Since 1993, the
decline has been 22.8%.38
The report followed a 1994 National Council on Crime and De-
linquency (NCCD) study which showed that juvenile crime repre-
sents a small and declining proportion of overall crime in
America.39 The NCCD reported that the ten year trend for 1982 to
1992 showed no increase-in fact, a slight decrease-in the propor-
tion of crime attributable to juveniles. The juvenile proportion of
total arrests decreased from 18% to 16%, while all serious crime
arrests decreased from 30% to 29%.40 While adult arrests for seri-
ous crimes increased by 15%, juvenile arrests increased just 5%.
In 1994, only 19.4% of those arrested for violent crime were under
35. Glazer, supra note 5, at 171-72; Kids Count Factbook, supra note 16, at 50.
36. Serranno & Savage, supra note 13, at Dl (explaining that violent crime
means murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault).
37. 1995 showed a 2.9% drop in arrests of 10 to 17 year olds for violent of-
fenses, an arrest rate of 511.9 youths per 100,000, down from 527.4 in 1994. Jack-
son, supra note 3, at Al.
38. Id
39. See generally Michael A. Jones & Barry Krisberg, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Images and Reality: Juvenile Crime, Youth Violence and
Public Policy (1994) (using 1992 data tracking crime trends from the FBI's annual
Uniform Crime Report and the U.S. Justice Department's annual National Crimi-
nal Victimization Survey, which includes crimes not reported to police).
40. Id. at 8-9.
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eighteen.41 Murder and rape comprised 7% of juvenile arrests for
violent crimes (aggravated assault and robbery accounted for the
other 93%) and less than 1.5% of all juvenile arrests that year.42
Juvenile arrests for violent crime increased by 45% over the
decade, reflecting an overall national increase in violent crime
(adult arrests increased 41% during the period). The age crime
curve-the tendency for offenders to commit crimes which peaks
during their younger years and declines with age-showed that
age-specific patterns remained about the same during the decade
for all crimes except murder.43 Experts attribute the sharp rise in
murder by young people beginning in 1985 to the same cause
which increased the nation's overall murder rate-the link be-
tween the drug trade and gun violence. Due to the rapid growth of
crack cocaine markets in the 1980s, juveniles were recruited and
armed, their guns disseminating into communities and increasing
the murder rate.44
Arrest statistics do not permit a completely accurate view of
the juvenile crime problem because the figures include repeat ar-
rests of single offenders, and juveniles tend to commit crimes in
groups. Thus, if police arrest five youths in connection with a mur-
der, this will appear as five homicide arrests, not one murder.45
Juvenile crime experts conclude that a core group of violent offend-
ers commit a disproportionate number of crimes, pushing statistics
even higher.46
Statistics on crimes also do not account for arrests cleared, so
figures based on numbers of arrests distort the picture of juvenile
violence.47 Juveniles consistently account for a smaller proportion
of arrests cleared than total arrests. For example, in 1992,
juveniles comprised 17.5% of all arrests for violent crime, but
12.5% of arrests cleared. Arrest cleared statistics show that the
proportion of violent crimes attributable to juveniles is actually
41. Kids Count Factbook, supra note 16, at 50.
42. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 10.
43. Alfred Blumstein, Violence by Young People: Why the Deadly Nexus?,
Nat'l. Inst. Just. J., Aug. 1995, at 3.
44. Id. at 5-6.
45. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 13.
46. Juvenile Crime Report Tells Complex Story of Violence, Prov. J. Bull., Oct.
14, 1993, at A15.
47. An offense is cleared, or solved, when at least one person is arrested,
charged and prosecuted. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 14.
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lower than the proportion of the youth population in the United
States, though the proportion of juvenile property crimes is higher
than the proportion of the youth population.48
1II. NATIONAL TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE INTIATIVES DEVELOP IN
RESPONSE TO PUBLIC PRESSURE
Recently, many state legislatures have revised their respective
juvenile codes in order to increase penalties for juvenile criminals,
including transfer into the adult correctional system to serve
longer sentences under more punitive conditions. These changes
include instituting various waiver mechanisms; opening previously
confidential records or juvenile court proceedings to the public;
making parents accountable for children's crimes;49 extending vic-
tims' rights so that they may attend proceedings or get restitution;
and enacting "three-strikes" laws (i.e., after three crimes, the court
treats a defendant as an adult).5 0 Of forty-four states that have
juvenile laws, or have revised their juvenile laws in the past two
years, thirty-five have enacted provisions for juvenile waiver.5 '
Waiver laws take various forms, which many states use in
combination. Judicial waiver grants the juvenile court discretion
to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile after a hearing, usually upon
request of the prosecutor in light of statutory criteria such as likeli-
hood of rehabilitation (guidelines often follow those enunciated in
the Kent decision). Judicial waivers increased sixty-eight percent
from 1988 to 1992, with the number of waivers nearly doubling for
all offense categories except property offenses.52 Prosecutorial
waiver, or concurrent jurisdiction, allows the prosecutor to choose,
based on age and offense criteria, whether to file charges in juve-
nile or criminal court, thus avoiding a waiver hearing. Legislative
waiver, or statutory exclusion, excludes certain offenses from juve-
nile court jurisdiction by statute. These statutes typically base au-
48. Id.
49. Maggie Gallagher, Sins of the Children are Visited on Their Parents, The
Sacramento Bee, May 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3297804; Kathy Lally, Pun-
ish thy Mothers and Fathers, Baltimore Sun, May 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL
6619743; Ellen Goodman, Should Society Punish Parents when They Fail?, State J.
Reg., May 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Stjreg File.
50. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24.
51. Id.
52. Melissa Sickmund, How Juveniles Get to Criminal Court, OJJDP Update
on Statistics, Juv. Just Bull. 1 (Oct. 1994).
RESPONSE TO JUVENILE CRIME
tomatic transfer to adult court on age, type of offense and/or prior
record. This scheme effectively lowers the upper age limit of juve-
nile court for certain crimes, especially murder and other offenses
against persons.5 3
In some states, courts may try youths as young as twelve as
adults; and in some extreme instances, age is irrelevant.54 Twenty
states automatically transfer juveniles to adult court if they com-
mit certain offenses.55 Florida's waiver laws typify recent
changes-1994 legislation gave prosecutors authority to try
juveniles as young as fourteen as adults; moreover, courts auto-
matically try delinquents with three previous convictions as
adults. Florida now sends more juveniles to adult court than all
other states combined.56
Many waiver laws are too harsh. In particular, prosecutorial
and statutory forms, which do not allow discretion in transferring
youths and thus increase the risk that youths who may have been
receptive to treatment are inappropriately sent to the adult sys-
tem, oppress youths. Experts note that the tendency to commit
crimes is age-specific, typically peaking in the late teen years and
declining thereafter.57 Research exhibits that the involvement in
serious violent crimes peaks for males between ages sixteen and
seventeen, and drops dramatically after age twenty. The likeli-
hood that individuals will commit violent crimes between ages
twenty-one and twenty-seven is approximately the same as for
twelve and thirteen year olds.58 Therefore, offenses at a young age
do not indicate future criminality, but rather suggest that rehabili-
tation can be effective, and longer sentences for juvenile offenders
have little impact on crime or public safety.59
Waiver statutes must not allow blind waiver of juveniles into
adult court. The waiver process must allow for a fact-specific in-
53. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 411-12; see also Guttman, supra note 8, at 521-
22; Sickmund, supra note 52, at 1, 3.
54. See Jeffrey B. Pine, Juvenile Waiver in Rhode Island, 2 Roger Wins. U.L.
Rev. 257, 269 n.105 (1997).
55. Glazer, supra note 5, at 176.
56. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24. Florida waived 7000 juveniles in 1995
alone. Id.
57. Blumstein, supra note 43, at 3.
58. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 35.
59. Id.
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quiry into the juvenile's situation.60 Automatically sentencing
juveniles to adult terms constitutes an overreaction that "will un-
fairly penalize kids who would have grown out of their criminal
tendencies or responded to counseling."61 Legislators who pass
drastic laws are responding not to a juvenile crime wave, but
rather to the cases of youths who commit exceptionally severe
offenses. 62
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RHODE ISLAND JuvENiLE JusTICE
SYSTEM
The development of Rhode Island's juvenile justice system
generally mirrors the evolution of American juvenile justice.63 In
1898, Rhode Island was the first state to legislatively mandate seg-
regated, juvenile adjudicatory hearings. This new legislation pro-
vided for separate hearings, calendars and dockets for juvenile
cases in Providence and Newport. 64 These procedures were ex-
tended to the rest of the state in 1915 with the enactment of the
Juvenile Court Act.65 Remaining in force until 1944, the Act estab-
lished a juvenile court within the district court. Young offenders
were not subject to criminal prosecution except for the offenses of
murder or manslaughter.
In Knott v. Langlois66 and In re Correia,67 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted the Kent due process guarantees and
guidelines for judicial waiver. The court held that the full investi-
gation statutorily required for waiver involved a waiver hearing, a
60. Cf. Guttman, supra note 8, at 525.
61. Glazer, supra note 5, at 177-78.
62. See Cloherty, supra note 19, at 430.
63. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24. The early juvenile courts made no proce-
dural or substantive distinction between offenders' criminal and noncriminal be-
havior. Children could be adjudicated without criminal due process safeguards
since, the court based its authority on parens patriae, "the role of the state as sur-
rogate parent for those unable to care for themselves." Cloherty, supra note 19, at
414 n.45. Judges always have had discretion to waive jurisdiction over serious
juvenile offenders. Id; see also Guttman, supra note 8, at 511-12 (discussingparens
patriae).
64. Rhode Island Governor's Justice Commission Statistical Analysis Center,
Rep. No. 35, Juveniles in Rhode Island: An Overview of the State's Juvenile Jus-
tice System and a Data Analysis/Statistical Summary Thru Year 1993 (Feb. 1995)
[hereinafter Statistical Summary].
65. 1915 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1185.
66. 231 A.2d 767 (R.I. 1967).
67. 243 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1968).
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minor's counsel access to a client's social service records, and a
court statement of reasons for waiving jurisdiction. In Langlois,
the court, addressing public safety, held that in determining
waiver, "the juvenile court must strike a balance between the de-
sirability of rehabilitating the offending child and the need to pro-
tect the security of the community."68
Rhode Island case law continued to hold that the state's juve-
nile justice system retained its traditional philosophy that
juveniles should not be treated as adults.6 9 In re Joseph T 7 0 and
State v. Mastracchio7' reaffirmed the emphasis on a waiver hear-
ing as the appropriate method of determining when a court should
treat a juvenile as an adult.72 The supreme court noted that the
waiver hearing judge, upon determining probable cause existed
that the juvenile had committed the crime charged, must weigh
the potential for rehabilitation with the need to protect society.73
In 1944, the juvenile court was removed from the district court
and a chief justice was appointed. 74 The juvenile court exercised
original jurisdiction over children under eighteen charged with
waywardness or delinquency; the court would then retain jurisdic-
tion until the juvenile was twenty-one. 75 Judges had discretion to
68. Langlois, 231 A.2d at 772. The Rhode Island Supreme Court did not es-
tablish subjective waiver standards in Langlois. However, in referencing a survey
of 50 juvenile courts, it identified five factors to be considered in determiningjuve-
nile waiver. (1) whether the factual issues are contestable, (2) whether the offense
occurred after correctional treatment for a previous transgression, (3) the juve-
nile's 'hopeless" condition, (4) the juvenile's attitude and (5) the resources of the
criminal court and the juvenile court for treatment and public safety. Id.
69. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139-40 (LI. 1980).
70. 575 A.2d 985 (RI. 1990).
71. 605 A.2d 489 (R-I. 1992).
72. In re Joseph T, 575 A.2d at 986; Mastracchio, 605 A.2d at 494.
73. Barbara A. Dillon, Topical Survey, Family Law: De Novo Hearing Proper
Mechanism for Waiving Juvenile Jurisdiction-State v. Mastracchio, 27 Suffolk U.
L. Rev. 540, 540 (1993) (summarizing Mastracchio, 605 A.2d 489). In Mastracchio,
the defendant was tried as an adult. A waiver hearing was not held because, at
the time he was charged, the defendant was 23 years old. Defendant's appeals
asserted that he should have been afforded a waiver hearing. He based this claim
on the fact that he was only 17 years old at the time he committed the offense.
Even so, the adult trial was deemed proper. The court found that because of the
cold-blooded nature of the murder, family court jurisdiction would have been
waived. That type of crime suggests a seasoned, mature and hardened criminal
who is not likely to be rehabilitated in three years until mandatory release at age
21. Mastracchio, 605 A.2d at 494.
74. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 416-17.
75. Id. at 417.
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waive to adult court a juvenile sixteen or older who committed an
offense that would subject an adult to indictment.76 Children
under sixteen remained immune from prosecution. Jurisdiction
over juvenile offenders was assumed by the Rhode Island Family
Court upon its creation in 1961. 77
The intent of Rhode Island's pre-1990 laws to protect the best
interests of children was reflected in state supreme court decisions
from the time the family court was established. In State v. Cook,7
the court held that the special jurisdiction of the family court to
adjudge a juvenile wayward or delinquent was intended to protect
children from criminal responsibility and conviction.79 Before
1990, Rhode Island law protected all children under eighteen from
criminal court sanctions except those over sixteen whom the family
court had waived in a hearing. However, the state enacted a form
of statutory exclusion in 1972, providing automatic prosecution as
adults for juvenile offenders over sixteen charged with a felony af-
ter being found delinquent for two prior felony offenses after age
sixteen.80 In 1981, the legislature lowered the maximum age for
family court original jurisdiction from twenty-one to eighteen. 8 '
V. THE CRIG PRICE CASE: RHODE ISLAND's WArvi AND
CERTIFICATION LAWS REVISED
In 1990, responding to public perception that the state juve-
nile system could not handle serious offenders, Rhode Island's leg-
islature revised the state's waiver and certification laws.82 The
change allowed family court to waive certain juveniles of any age
to superior court.83 It also created a certification procedure that
increased the court's sentencing power over non-waived youths.
The catalyst for this legislative initiative was the highly publi-
cized Craig Price case.84 Price pled guilty to having murdered four
76. Id. at 419-22.
77. Id. at 417-18 (citing 1961 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 73, §§ 1, 20).
78. 210 A.2d 577 (R.I. 1965).
79. Id. at 579 (citing Givardi v. Juvenile Court, 142 A. 542 (RI. 1928)).
80. R-I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7.1 (1981), repealed by 1990 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 15,
§ 1, ch. 18, § 1.
81. Id § 14-1-6, repealed by 1990 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 15, § 1, ch. 18, § 1.
82. Id. §§ 14-1-7 to -7.4 (1994).
83. Id.
84. Tony Depaul, Youth, 15, is Charged with Slaying Warwick Woman, Her
Daughters, Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 18, 1989, at Al; House Approves Bill on Juvenile
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neighbors: a mother and her two young daughters when he was
fifteen and another woman when he was thirteen.8 5 Because he
committed all of the crimes before age sixteen, he received the
maximum sentence then available under the Rhode Island juvenile
law: detention at the Rhode Island Training School until his
twenty-first birthday.8 6
Rhode Island's 1990 legislation was in part a response to
mandatory release at age twenty-one of youth offenders, like Craig
Price, adjudicated for serious crimes committed before age sixteen.
The new waiver and certification procedures were intended to
toughen penalties for youth offenders of any age by increasing the
likelihood of transfer to superior court. Once transferred, juveniles
are likely to receive longer sentences.
Rhode Island law now provides the family court jurisdiction
over juveniles under eighteen years of age who are charged with
any offense. Unless the juvenile is waived, the family court retains
jurisdiction until age twenty-one.8 7 Pursuant to the 1990 legisla-
tion,s s waiver is effective for the offense upon which the motion is
based and other offenses pending adjudication. It remains in effect
for subsequent offenses unless the juvenile is acquitted.8 9
In general, Rhode Island's waiver process provides a fair
mechanism for the transfer of hard-core offenders to the adult sys-
tem because it preserves family court discretion. The family court
retains discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether
the offense committed is serious enough to warrant waiver and
whether rehabilitation of the offender is unlikely to occur. Waiver
to the superior court then forever terminates family court jurisdic-
tion. Juvenile waiver, once initiated by the Attorney General may
be approved after a waiver hearing. Waiver hearings require the
Attorney General to establish probable cause by a preponderance
of the evidence. It also must be shown, by means of the juvenile's
Punishment, Prov. J. Bull., Mar. 29, 1990, at D7; Young Edler Spurs Senate Ac-
tion, Prov. J. Bull., Jan 3, 1990, at A7.
85. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 407.
86. Id. (citing In re Richard P., 451 A.2d 274, 278 (R.I. 1982)).
87. R.I. Gen- Laws § 14-1-6(a) (1994).
88. Id §§ 14-1-7 to -7.4.
89. Id. §§ 14-1-6, -7.1(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996). These provisions would have
precluded Mastracchio's two appeals. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 426 n.105.
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history of offending, the heinousness of the crime, and the need to
protect public safety, that the waiver is necessary.90
The 1990 law also created a certification process by which the
family court may sentence a child of any age to the maximum pen-
alty for an offense, to be served in the Rhode Island Training
School (RITS) while the offender remains a juvenile, followed by
transfer to an adult facility.91 While a hearing must still be con-
ducted for waivers, the minimum age and prior offense require-
ments are eliminated where the offense, if committed by an adult,
would be punishable by life imprisonment.9 2 For a felony level of-
fense, the offender must be at least sixteen to be waived, but can be
certified at any age.93
Certification requires a showing of probable cause and neces-
sity. In addition, the Attorney General must show that family
court jurisdiction until age twenty-one provides insufficient time to
rehabilitate.94 However, the procedure makes family court pro-
ceedings functionally equivalent to superior court criminal trials,
the only occasion on which a juvenile is afforded a jury trial in fam-
ily court. Conviction results in two mandatory sentencing alterna-
tives: (1) the certified and convicted juvenile may be sentenced to
the RITS until age twenty-one or (2) the juvenile may be held at
the RITS until the court decides to transfer the juvenile to an adult
facility, with transfer hearings held annually.95
A 1992 amendment lowered from twenty-one to eighteen, the
age at which the family court must schedule reviews of certified,
adjudicated youths' cases.96 It also specified that the youth must
prove sufficient efforts at rehabilitation by clear and convincing ev-
idence in order to avoid transfer of jurisdiction over the sentence to
90. R.I. Gen- Laws § 14-1-7.1 (Supp. 1996). In actual practice most waivers
are not by hearing, but are voluntary as a result of negotiation. In some cases, an
adult sentence is also negotiated.
91. Id. §§ 14-1-7.2 to -7.3 (1994).
92. Id § 14-1-7(a).
93. Id. §§ 14-1-7.2(c), -7(b). Certification is mandatory for a juvenile charged
with a felony with two prior felony-level offenses since age 16. Id. Waiver or certi-
fication is mandatory for a juvenile charged with a felony drug offense who had
committed one prior drug offense since age 16. Id. §14-1-7.4.
94. Id. § 14-1-7.2(a)(3).
95. Id. § 14-1-7.3.
96. Id. § 14-1-42 (establishing transfer hearing procedures for certified and
adjudicated juveniles).
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the Department of Corrections.97 Without efforts at rehabilitation,
the youth is remanded to the Rhode Island Training School to
await further hearings.
A 1994 amendment mandates transfer of a juvenile who has
been certified and adjudicated to the Department of Corrections if
the family court determines he poses a threat to public safety or to
others at the training school. 98 The law was further amended in
1995 to provide for a hearing to consider probable cause by the
same family court judge conducting the waiver hearing. The hear-
ing is predicated upon findings at a prior detention hearing that
the offense had been committed by the youth charged.99
In keeping with the national trend, Rhode Island law has
shifted away from its previous rehabilitative emphasis by ex-
panding legal provisions for treating juveniles as adults. Waiver
hearings are still required, but now focus on offense type and past
record of offending. Certification retains rehabilitation as a goal,
but as a mechanism for long-term "adult" sentences, it is not gener-
ally in the child's best interest. In addition, automatic certification
of repeat offenders over age sixteen creates an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that these offenders are unlikely to be rehabilitated. Fi-
nally, certification also may result in reverse effects on
punishment, if the family court imposes harsher sentences than
the superior court.100
VI. IviPACT OF RHODE IsLAqD's WAIvER STATUTE: HAS IT
AFFECTED JUVENmE CRIME TENns?
In the first two years after the 1990 legislation passed, four-
teen juveniles were waived or certified.101 According to data
tracked by the Attorney General's Juvenile Prosecution Unit, 125
waiver petitions have been filed since 1993.
In contrast to the waiver alternative, certification is rarely
used. Some motions for certification actually result in voluntary
waivers. Of three certifications filed in 1995, two resulted in vol-
untary waivers, and one was pending. In addition, three certifica-
tion filings in each of the previous two years also did not result in
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 14-1-7.1 (Supp. 1996).
100. See Glazer, supra note 5, at 176.
101. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 425 n.96.
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actual certifications. One youth who was certified in 1993 with-
drew his plea and was waived.' 0 2
While public perception in Rhode Island regarding an increase
in the juvenile crime rate is supported by numerical data collected
from the family court reporter, no analysis compares profiles of
waived and non-waived youths' cases. According to a Rhode Island
Governor's Justice Commission compilation of crime data for the
period from 1970 to 1994, the Rhode Island crime rate reached a
twenty-five year low in 1994 and was projected to continue de-
creasing.'0 3 Consistent with FBI figures for the early 1990s,
10 4
numbers of total crimes and property crimes in Rhode Island de-
creased in the early 1990s. Violent crimes of rape, robbery and as-
sault also decreased in the 1990s. L0 5 This decline occurred after a
period of state statistics which paralleled national trends of in-
creased violent crime in the mid-to-late 1980s.-0 6
The Justice Commission does not specify how many of the to-
tal number of crimes were committed by juveniles, but it does issue
statistics on juvenile arrest rates.'0 7 The Commision's 1995 re-
port, compiling data through 1993, showed that total juvenile ar-
rests have shown slight increases and decreases annually, from
8343 in 1987 to 9000 in 1993; with a low of 7825 in 1988 and a high
of 9586 in 1990.108 Total property and other non-violent crime ar-
rests showed a similar fluctuation, but total violent crime arrests
greatly increased from 266 in 1989 to 660 in 1993.109 Juvenile vio-
lent crime offenses in 1995 numbered 9802, or 6% of juvenile
crimes that year. 1 10
102. Statistics were acquired from the Rhode Island Department of the Attor-
ney General and are on fie with the Roger Willams University Law Review.
103. Rhode Island Governor's Justice Commission Statistical Analysis Center,
Rep. No. 37, Highlights and Analysis from 25 Years of Collecting Serious Crime
Data, at 9 (1995) (citing numbers and rates of various crimes in the state) [herein-
after Highlights].
104. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 10 (showing the serious and violent
crime rate declining).
105. Id. Homicide rates, however, after decreasing from 1990 to 1992, in-
creased between 1992 and 1994.
106. Highlights, supra note 103, at 9.
107. Id. at 20-23.
108. Id.
109. Statistical Summary, supra note 64, at 20.
110. Kids Count Factbook, supra note 16, at 50.
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The caution with which total crime statistics must be ex-
amined is illustrated by the comparison of the 1993 data showing
nineteen juvenile homicides in Rhode Island to previous years'
data, which showed an annual average of three homicides involv-
ing juveniles. The data from 1993 included six deaths in a single
arson incident."' In addition, one shall remember the flow of
youths charged with multiple offenses." 2
The 10,563 juvenile family court charges in 1993 represented
an 18% increase over the number of 1990 charges and a 32.5% in-
crease since 1988.113 In 1995, 4191 juveniles were referred to fain-
ily court for a total of 9802 charges." 4 Violent crime offenses
accounted for only 6% of the offenses referred to family court, while
property offenses constituted 35% of the total. 1 5
The Attorney General's Juvenile Prosecution Unit reported a
36.6% increase in cases disposed in family court, from 1013 in 1987
to 1599 in 1993. The number of trials increased 6.7% from 30 (with
15 not guilty verdicts) to 32 (12 not guilty). Plea bargains in-
creased by 56.9%; cases dismissed by 182.7%.116 Those receiving
probation decreased 20%. The number of juveniles sent to the
RITS as a result of family court proceedings increased 175% from
44 to 121.117 All of these statistics have been steadily increasing,
while the probation statistics decreased before the new waiver and
certification legislation was passed.
The impact of the Rhode Island waiver statute may be re-
flected in a comparison of the RITS population before and after
1990. In 1987, 64.6% of the RITS population were violent juvenile
offenders." 8 In 1993, 57% of the RITS population were adjudi-
cated for property crimes and 43% for violent crimes. Compara-
tively, 53% of adults incarcerated at the ACI were violent
offenders."19 The public defender's caseload of juveniles defended
for misdemeanors and status offenses remained stable between the
111. Statistical Summary, supra note 64, at 15.
112. Kids Count Factbook, supra note 16, at 50; see text accompanying notes
45-46.
113. Statistical Summary, supra note 64, at 24.
114. Kids Count Factbook, supra note 16, at 50.
115. Id.
116. Statistical Summary, supra note 64, at 24.
117. Id. at 31.
118. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 424-25 n.96.
119. Statistical Summary, supra note 64, at 17.
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two comparison years of 1989 and 1993; however, the caseload of
juveniles defended for felonies decreased 10% from 1048 to 943
(possibly a result of waiver of more of these cases). 120
A national comparative study of youths who are waived into
the adult system may suggest that many of these offenders are not
hard-core criminals who cannot be rehabilitated. The nationwide
increase in the use of waiver as well as the 43% increase in the rate
of incarceration of juveniles 121 is likely attributable more to bur-
geoning "tough-on-crime" measures than to increased juvenile
crime, since the crime rate has remained stable or decreased in
recent years.12 2 There is increasing sentiment that these laws
may overcompensate for a violent, remorseless few by abandoning
efforts to reform the majority of young offenders. A punitive ap-
proach may not serve either society in general or the specific
youngsters serving time in adult prisons. 12 3
VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAIvER ENACTMENTS: THE ADULT
SYSTEI DEALING wrmH YouTFuL OFFENDERS
Proponents of tougher laws argue that the juvenile system
was not designed and is not able to handle youths who commit vio-
lent crimes. However, neither is the adult system equipped to deal
with younger offenders.' 2 4 Those advocating punitive measures
without treatment are endangering children and risking the conse-
quences of perpetuating violence and criminal behavior. 12 5 Laws
aimed at lengthy incarceration of youth without rehabilitation de-
humanize children. In addition, these laws are counterproductive
to society, and deny youths the chance to lead a productive life. 2 6
120. Id.
121. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 424 n.96 (The increase spans from 1977 to
1987.).
122. Id.
123. See Laura Murphy Lee, Should 13-Year-Olds Who Commit Crimes With
Firearms Be Tried as Adults? No: Avoid Simplistic Solutions, 80 A.B.A. J. 47, 47
(1994); Sam Skolnik, Trying Kids as Adults Proves Trying, Legal Times, Feb. 19,
1995, at 7.
124. Glazer, supra note 5, at 172.
125. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 1.
126. Skolnik, supra note 123, at 7; see Cloherty, supra note 19, at 435 n.156
(discussing five year sentences as more harmful to juveniles than to adult, virtu-
ally destroying positive life chances for teen offender) (citing Martin L. Forst &
Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of
Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323, 374 (1991); Frank-
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There are numerous reasons why most juveniles do not belong
in the adult correctional system. The foremost reason is that at-
taining a certain age or committing a certain type of offense does
not transform a juvenile into an adult. Most youths are still ma-
turing mentally and emotionally and are more amenable to treat-
ment than adults. This is the philosophy upon which the juvenile
system was founded.
Secondly, those seeking tougher punishment for juveniles may
not be sated by sending them to adult court. Evidence suggests the
opposite is true in many instances; youths, appearing less danger-
ous compared to hardened adult criminals, are treated less harshly
in the adult system. Many judges are reluctant to send youths to
adult prisons because the prisons may expose the juveniles to ex-
treme danger, and the prisons are unprepared to meet the educa-
tional and other special needs of the juveniles. Therefore,
offenders are more likely to emerge as potential career criminals
than rehabilitated individuals ready to reenter society. Further-
more, incarcerating juvenile populations comes at an increased
cost to the adult correctional system and further strains already
overcrowded prisons.
Roughly half of the juvenile cases transferred to adult court
get dismissed for lack of evidence. NCCD research indicates that
conviction rates in juvenile courts surpass those for comparable
crimes in adult courts, and that penalties administered by juvenile
courts are no more lenient-and in some cases harsher-than
those given transferred juveniles in adult court.127 Big-time juve-
nile actors become small-time adult criminal actors and are more
often acquitted or given lighter sentences or probation.' 28 For
juveniles who are tried and convicted as adults, age becomes a mit-
igating factor because they appear less threatening to judges and
juries compared to hardened adult criminals. 29
lin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In De-fense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 267, 270
(1991); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punish-
ment, Treatment and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 821, 911 (1988)).
127. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 1.
128. Glazer, supra note 5, at 177; see also Guttman, supra note 8, at 529 (citing
Ira M. Schwartz et al., Center for the Study of Youth Policy, A Study of New Mex-
ico's Youthful Offenders 4 (1995)).
129. Glazer, supra note 5, at 177. Research regarding how violent offenders
were processed through juvenile courts in 10 states showed that 57% of robbery,
55% of violent sex offense, 53% of murder and 44% of aggravated assault referrals
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Third, juvenile offenders sent to adult prison are subjected to
more brutality and contagion effects of older, hardened criminals
who teach them new criminal tricks. 130 Adult prisons have fewer
treatment services, such as psychological counseling or job training
and education. Thus, instead of rehabilitating juveniles, they have
the opposite effect of ushering juveniles into the world of adult
crime. 131 "It's kind of scary to think what kind of monster may be
created" when a youth incarcerated at thirteen is released at age
thirty-three after having been raised in prison,132 ill-equipped to
become a productive member of society. Sending a youth for an
adult trial may stigmatize him as a lost cause in society's eyes and
his own. Harsh treatment, rather than scaring youths straight,
may have the opposite effect, by making matters worse and en-
gendering bitterness, leading youths to take pride in criminal
exploits.' 3 3
Furthermore, the effectiveness of waiving juveniles to the
adult system is questionable. There is no evidence that tougher
laws have any deterrent effect or protect the public any better, and
the effect on recidivism is undetermined.1- 4 Prevention, rehabili-
tation and appropriate aftercare programs are less costly and more
socially desirable goals.
Demonstrative of the effectiveness of waiver is a study by Pro-
fessor Jeffrey Fagan showing that New York youths sentenced as
adults for robbery or burglary were much more likely to be re-
arrested than New Jersey youths sentenced as juveniles for compa-
rable crimes.135 Florida, which leads the nation in sending youths
resulted in guilty dispositions. By comparison, a study of adult felony sentences in
state courts showed that 37% of sex offense, 53% of murder and 13% of aggravated
assault charges resulted in conviction; see also Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at
24-25. But see Forst & Blomquist, supra note 126, at 351.
130. Peter Reinharz & Jerome G. Miller, Face Off. The Carrot or the Stick,
Scholastic Update, at 12.
131. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24; Lee, supra note 123, at 47.
132. Richard Lacayo, When Kids Go Bad, Time, Sept. 19, 1994, at 60.
133. Reinharz & Miller, supra note 130, at 12; Gest & Pope, supra note 4, at 36.
134. Guttman, supra note 8, at 528.
135. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24. Jefferey Fagan, Director of the Center
for Violence Research and Prevention at the Columbia University School of Public
Health, compared cases of 15 and 16 year olds charged with robbery or burglary in
New York and New Jersey. The New York youths were treated as adults, while
the New Jersey youths were treated as juveniles. The study found the juvenile
system no more lenient than adult courts, with youths in both systems incarcer-
ated for equal amounts of time. Id.
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to adult prison, provides an even more drastic example of the
criminalizing effects of adult prison. According to a study of juve-
nile offenders tried in adult courts by two University of Florida
professors, those sentenced to adult prisons reverted to a life of
crime sooner after release and committed an increased number of
and more serious crimes than those incarcerated in juvenile insti-
tutions. 13 6 Furthermore, they were more likely than adults to re-
turn to a life of crime after release.13 7
Dangers to youth go beyond turning them to a life of crime.
They may end up victims of sexual predators, racial attacks or
other violence, like the seventeen year old Ohio youth stabbed to
death in an adult prison by members of a white supremacist
group.1a
Finally, one may view the serious juvenile offender as a symp-
tom of societal problems that extend beyond the scope of the juve-
nile justice system. 139 Child offenders are also victims deserving
an opportunity to be rehabilitated. 140 The solution is not a quick
fix. Abandoning the hope of reform for swifter retributive methods
by targeting the causes of youth crime, which include family break-
downs and the prevalence of drugs and guns, is not a complete
solution.
While sending teens to adult prisons may give the community
a sense of security, public safety is not served by adult treatment of
youths that has no superior deterrent or incapacitating effects
compared to juvenile court treatment.' 41 The Center for Youth
Policy declared, after a recent study, that it found no compelling
evidence that either enhanced prosecution or stiffer penalties can
prevent or control violent and serious youth crime. ' 42 The Florida
study demonstrated that transfer has little deterrent value, which
is shown by the rate of youths' reversion to criminal behavior. 143
While the prospect of jail could make a difference in some youths'
decisions of the crimes they are willing to commit, few young of-
fenders are so calculating as to plan their criminal acts while tak-
136. Glazer, supra note 5, at 176.
137. I&
138. Id.; Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24.
139. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 435.
140. Guttman, supra note 8, at 510.
141. Id. at 528.
142. Lee, supra note 123, at 47.
143. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24.
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ing into account the consequences. 1' Since evidence shows youths
receive equal or more harsh treatment in juvenile courts, trying
youths in adult courts has not produced any incapacitative benefits
that enhance public safety. 145 Because young offenders who re-
ceive adult sentences are more likely to return to society to commit
additional crimes, public safety is better served by the rehabilita-
tive approach of the juvenile system.
Those who advocate putting more youths into the adult system
ignore the fact that the adult system also has problems and has
been criticized for releasing too many criminals. 146 Critics of the
new laws call them fiscally irresponsible, 147 and trend watchers
who combine rising numbers of youth arrests with the projected
increase in the youth population realize that there will not be
enough money or enough prisons to lock up an ever-increasing
number of young people.148 According to the NCCD, overcrowding
in juvenile facilities only adds to the problem.
The director of the Florida Juvenile Justice Advisory Board,
lamenting that some detention centers are at 200% capacity with a
cost of ninety-three dollars a day per youth, concluded that it
would be cheaper to place a child in a hotel or send him to Harvard
for a year.' 49 Rather than waiving them to adult court, many
youths with offenses of low severity who are detained in juvenile
detention centers might safely be referred to non-institutional pro-
grams. This would make the juvenile institutions available to ac-
commodate more serious offenders. 150  The juvenile offender
should not be penalized with "adult" treatment because of the lack
of available services in the juvenile system. High costs may result
in more revisions in juvenile justice policy, leading to cheaper and
more effective alternatives to incarceration. 15
144. Lacayo, supra note 132, at 62.
145. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24.
146. Id.
147. Eg., Lee, supra note 123, at 47.
148. Gest & Pope, supra note 4, at 36.
149. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24.
150. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Juv. Just. Pol'y Statement 5-
6 (1991).
151. Butterfield, supra note 12, at 24.
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VIII. PROFILE OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: No SIMPLISTIC
SOLUTIONS
Non-discretionary transfer of young people to adult court fails
to assess: (1) the individual juvenile's background, (2) reasons for
offending and (3) amenability to treatment. Approaches to the ju-
venile offender problem must go beyond the simplistic approach of
incapacitating the offender before the court to those measures that
recognize that the juvenile offender is one product of a society
which fails to meet all of its children's needs. "Get-tough" policies
try to solve the problem of juvenile crime by lowering the age of
adulthood rather than recognizing the problem as a failure of soci-
ety.'5 2 If treatment has thus far been ineffective, the incentive
should be to develop better approaches, not to avoid the problem
through waiver.' 5 3
Indicators of future delinquency are well-known, since youth-
ful offenders have similar backgrounds and risk factors. Profiles of
youths who commit violent crimes are strikingly similar: (1) im-
poverished upbringing, (2) sub-standard housing and health care,
(3) inadequate education and (4) serious domestic problems rang-
ing from parental absence and neglect to physical and sexual
abuse. 5 4 In a 1989 study, children born in the same hospitals and
living in the same communities were compared, and it was discov-
ered that those abused or neglected were significantly more likely
152. Id.
153. Guttman, supra note 8, at 536.
154. Lee, supra note 123, at 47. A 1993 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention report identified five categories of causes and correlates of
delinqueny.
(1) individual characteristics such as alienation, rebelliousness, and lack
of bonding to society, (2) family influences such as parental conflict, child
abuse, and family history of problem behavior (substance abuse, criminal-
ity, teen pregnancy, and school dropout); (3) school experiences such as
early academic failure and lack of commitment to school; (4) peer group
influences such as friends who engage in problem behavior (minor crimi-
nality, gangs, and violence); and (5) neighborhood and community factors
such as economic deprivation, high rates of substance abuse and crime,
and low neighborhood attachment.
Guttman, supra note 8, at 516 (quoting John J. Wilson & James C. Howell, Office
of Juv. Just & Delinq. Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Just., A Comprehensive Strategy
for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders 9 (1993)).
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to be arrested for violent crimes. 155 A separate study of delin-
quents under age ten in Hennepin County, Minnesota, showed
that four and five year olds were often reported for arson-an act
common among sexual abuse victims.
156
Reports of very young offenders-children less than twelve
committing serious crimes, like the six year old California boy who
beat an infant-are alarming. In 1994, 110,000 children under
thirteen were arrested in the United States for acts considered
felonies: 11,700 of those for crimes against people, including
thirty-nine murders.157 Adult treatment is even less adequate to
deal with these pre-adolescents. Offending at an extremely young
age indicates the need for early intervention, not earlier punish-
ment. It is essential that resources be allocated for children who
start committing crimes early while they are more treatable and
before they evolve into superpredators that the public fears and
writes off as not worth saving.158 Experts may be better able to
deal with children's problems at three or five years old than at fif-
teen. Early treatment is better and less costly than having today's
five year old end up before a court for more serious offenses in an-
other decade. 159
Transfer based on age alone is improper without consideration
of maturity level. Attainment of a certain age or commission of a
certain type of offense does not mean the offender has mentally
reached adulthood. 160 Psychologists note that amenability to reha-
bilitation depends on the offender's stage of development. A child
still in the adolescent phase is more open to change, modification
and guidance. Children deprived of nurturing in their early years,
those who live in urban areas plagued by poverty and violence or
who come from abusive homes-the most likely profile of juvenile
offenders- are also those most likely to be immature and amena-
155. Rise in Younger Offenders Alarms Child Welfare Officials, Prov. J. Bull.,
May 5, 1996, at A18; see also Cathy Spatz Widom, The Cycle of Violence, 244 Sci-
ence 160 (1989).
156. Rise in Younger Offenders Alarms Child Welfare Officials, Prov. J. Bull.,
May 5, 1996, at A18.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Guttman, supra note 8, at 527.
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ble to rehabilitation.) 61 Segregation from other social services
handicaps the juvenile justice system's ability to rehabilitate.
United States Attorney General Janet Reno stresses the need
for a continuum of government attention, beginning with prenatal
care and involving the school system, housing authority, health
services and job training. She also recommends delinquency pre-
vention programs, including mentoring, dispute resolution and
truancy prevention.162 Reno attributed the 1995 drop in juvenile
crime arrests to more successful community intervention and pre-
vention efforts, and the identification of truly violent young offend-
ers for trial as adults. 63 While Reno supports giving prosecutors
more discretion to prosecute youth offenders as adults, she also
emphasizes the importance of efforts to eliminate drugs and guns
to reduce youth crime.' 64
Too often, policy discussions on tougher measures for juvenile
offenders fail to address the fact that juveniles are victims of vio-
lence much more often than they are perpetrators, and many juve-
nile offenders have been victims themselves. For every youth
arrested for a violent crime, there are fourteen youth victims of
violent crime, and the overwhelming majority of the nearly one
million young victims each year are victims of crimes by adults, not
other juveniles.165
During the past decade the single most important impact on
youth violence and homicide has been the availability of firearms.
Children are being killed by guns in increasing numbers-a rise of
144% between 1986 and 1992.166 Four times as many youths were
murdered with guns in 1994 than in 1984.167 Laws permitting
confiscation of guns from juveniles, while almost universal, need
more aggressive, skillful enforcement. Proposals include better
means of detecting guns from a distance, and better efforts to di-
minish illegal gun markets commensurate with the aggressive pur-
suit of illegal drug markets in the past fifteen years. 168 One
161. Id. at 533-34.
162. Attorney General Janet Reno, Fighting Youth Violence: The Future Is
Now, 11 Crim. Just. 30, 33 (1995).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 18-19.
166. Id. at 16.
167. Jackson, supra note 3, at AS.
168. Bluistein, supra note 43, at 6-9.
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successful program is being conducted by the Boston Police De-
partment in cooperation with the United States Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms. It traces guns used in crimes and uses fol-
low-up procedures to reduce illicit gun sales.16 9
CONCLUSION
A model juvenile justice system protects society from violent
juvenile criminals and effectively reforms youths who can be saved,
but it must differentiate between the two. This does not require,
as some advocate, disposing of the juvenile system and transfer-
ring youths with little or no discretion.' 70 Under Kent, the juvenile
transfer policy was meant to remove only those juveniles, de-
scribed as chronic, serious, violent, sophisticated and mature, who
are beyond the purview of juvenile court.17 1 Punishing young peo-
ple as adults holds them to adult standards when imposing sanc-
tions, while in larger society juveniles are considered morally,
educationally, and socially immature, and are denied privileges of
adulthood. Furthermore, the impact of a lengthy, adult-type sen-
tence differs qualitatively for a youth in formative years from a
similar sentence imposed on an adult.172
Many current juvenile transfer policies consider neither the
causes of juvenile violence nor the consequences of long-term incar-
ceration.' 73 Both causes and effects must be taken into account by
policy makers revising juvenile offender laws.174 About sixty per-
cent of teens caught by police are not arrested again. Those who
do, return to the system quickly and then it becomes evident that
tougher measures are warranted. 175 Experts, who point out that
treating too many youths as adults inappropriately targets some
youths who could be managed in the juvenile system, suggest esca-
lating penalties; if youths do not stop committing crimes after mod-
est sanctions, then tougher penalties will be imposed.
169. Jackson, supra note 3, at A5.
170. Lacayo, supra note 132, at 61.
171. Guttman, supra note 8, at 525-26.
172. Cloherty, supra note 19, at 434-35.
173. Guttman, supra note 8, at 520.
174. E.g., id.
175. Glazer, supra note 5, at 177. The United States Justice Department re-
cently funded "Safe Futures" plans in six cities to establish escalating penalties for
juveniles. Gest & Pope, supra note 4, at 36.
RESPONSE TO JUVENILE CRIME
Reduction of youth crime and violence will not be best accom-
plished by punitive and politically popular but ineffective policies
that automatically transfer juveniles to the adult correctional sys-
tem. There is no reliable evidence that transferring juveniles to
adult court deters crime or recidivism or has incapacitative effects
superior to those of juvenile court disposition. In fact, the juvenile
system may better promote public safety through rehabilitation.
The juvenile courts are better equipped and more experienced in
handling juvenile offenders and can improve with investment in
methods that focus on prevention and treatments that promote
positive transitions from youth to adulthood. 176 Indeed, "both the
public and the juvenile are better served when the juvenile court
retains jurisdiction"177 because of the investment society has made
in its youth.
Judicial waiver statutes that provide clear guidelines for as-
sessing the individual's situation before transfer can protect the
goals of the juvenile system by preventing unnecessary and inap-
propriate transfers. Policies and statutes encouraging or mandat-
ing systematic transfer without close scrutiny on a case-by-case
basis of each youth's particular circumstances belie the overall
goals of our criminal justice system and invite more devastating
long-term consequences. Both prosecutorial and statutory waiver
risk inappropriate transfers. Discretionary waiver, on the other
hand, based on the offender's maturity, dangerous propensity and
likelihood of rehabilitation, allows the juvenile system to serve
those amenable to treatment more appropriately so that they may
be better prepared to become productive adults when they rejoin
society.
176. Jones & Krisberg, supra note 39, at 42.
177. Guttman, supra note 8, at 531.
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